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Summary  findings
Drawing on earlier work,  Caprio reviews some of the  transparent,  supervision is weak, and other ingredients
salient facts about the boom in banking busts in  critical to sound banking are either missing or scarcer
developing countrres. He then reviews policy responses  than in industrial countries.
taken by authorities  in some of the "early" crisis  Caprio calls for a multipillar approach to safe and
countries, and considers a wider menu of responses - in  sound banking, one that would:
particular the currently popular suggestion that  - Focus attention on factors that restrict banks' ability
promulgating an International Banking Standard would  and willingness to diversify risk.
significantly improve the safety and soundness of  - Give three key groups - owners (and managers),
banking systems in developing countries.  the market (including uninsured debtholders and other
Such a standard is not without appeal, but other  possible "co-owners"), and supervisors -more  incentive
approaches are probably necessary in developing  and ability to monitor banks and ensure their prudent
countries where risks are usually greater, financial  corporate governance.
inststutions are less diversified, markets are less
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Paper prepared  for the Brookings  Conference,  "FDICIA:  Bank  Reform  Five Years  Later
and Five Years  Ahead,"  December  19, 1996.  Conversations  with and comments  from
Phil Brock,  Asli Demirguc-Kunt,  Philip Keefer, Ross Levine,  Fernando  Montes-Negret,
anLd  Mary Shirley  helped  clarify  some  of the thoughts  expressed  herein,  and Anqing Shi
provided excellent  assistance  with the data set.II.  Introduction
W{idespread  bank insolvency  has been  relatively commonplace  in the last 15  years  and
quite costly. Although  the typical  banking crisis in an OECD  country  has been  financed
readily, albeit with some  pain, in many developing  countries  the scope  of the crisis  and
the cost have  been  enormous. Honohan  (1996) courageously  regresses  resolution  costs
oin  a set of variables  and finds that  poorer countres tend to have  more  expensive  crises  as
a share of GDP. Economists  and other  policy advisers  have  been  responding  to this
development  with a more  concerted  effort at the IMF,  the World  Bank  and other
multilateral  development  banks,  and now through the G-10  deputies  and  the BIS,  to put
banking sector  work  in developing  countries  at the forefront  of their efforts.
This paper  will briefly  review  some of the salient  facts  related  to the boom  in
banking busts in developing  or emerging  market economies,  drawing  heavily  on earlier
work (Caprio-Klingebiel,  1996a,  b; Honohan, 1996;  Lindgren,  Garcia,  and Saal, 1996;
and Goldstein  and Turner,  1996). When  countries encounter  banking  crises,  they  tend  to
respond with changes  in regulation  and supervision,  and not surprisingly  some  of these
changes  have been  more  effective  than  others. After reviewing  briefly  information  on the
scope and cost of banking  crises in developing  countries,  section  two will therefore  focus
ont  the policy  responses  taken by authorities  in some of the 'early' crisis  countries  -- those
which experienced  insolvency  episodes  in the 1980s. Lastly,  section  three  will review  a
wider menu of responses,  and discuss  in particular the suggestion  that the promulgation
of an Intemnational  Banking  Standard  (IBS) would significantly  improve  the safety  and
soundness  of developing  country  banking  systems. Although  this approach  has a great
deal of appeal,  and may  have some  payoff in some of the higher  middle  income  countries,2
other approaches are likely necessary in developing countries where the risks usually are
greater, financial institutions are less diversified, markets are less transparent, supervision
is relatively weak, and other critical ingredients for successful implementation of a
supervisory-based 'cure' for unsafe banking are absent.  Given these differences, the
paper concludes by arguing that bigger carrots and bigger sticks will be necessary in
emerging markets if bank insolvency is to be successfully contained. Although
improving bank supervision is a worthy goal, by itself exporting banking standards from
industrial to developing countries likely will have relatively little impact on the safety and
soundness of banking there in the next decade.  The paper ends by calling for a multi-
pillar approach to safe and sound banking, strengthening the incentives and capacity of
owners and managers, the market, and supervisors to contribute to prudent corporate
governance of banks, as well as for greater attention to factors restricting banks ability
and willingness to diversify risk.  Only if each of these four pillars is strengthened will
the resulting system perform the important intermediation functions prudently.
II.  The Epidemic and the Response
The Boom in Bust Banks
The boom in banking crises, both overt and covert, around the world in the last 15 years
has led to increased attention to this issue and better, but still inadequate, information
about these problems. Figures 1 and 2 summarize the incidence of banking problems in
two main data sets on bank insolvency developed at the World Bank (Caprio and
Klingebiel, 1  996a, b, hereafter C-K) and the IMF (Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal, 1996,
henceforth LGS). Although the data sets clearly overlap, there are differences. C-K's3
systemic bank episodes are those in which capital and provisions were, or were judged
likely to be, overwhelmed by loan losses, or in other words, in which net worth of the
banking system as a whole was near zero or negative.  Even though the authors recognize
that insolvency can become systemic even while net worth of the system clearly is
positive, this definition of systemic was chosen for its ease of implementation, and
because most economists would agree that negative net worth for the system as a whole
constitutes a systemic problem, even if some banks are still solvent. Importantly, this
data set mixes countries with overt crises, in the form of bank runs, collapses, and
government takeover, with more silent financial distress, in which banks are open but
insolvent.  LGS instead distinguish between the two: their 'crisis'  countries in Figure 2
show overt crises, and then they partition the rest of the world into either significant or
insignificant/no information cases relying largely on judgment (LGS, p.20).  Clearly
judgments and terms differ. Thus LGS refer to the Canadian banking problems in the
early 1980s as "significant," whereas for C-K Canada is not even considered a
"borderline" case, meaning that it was not thought to be close to a systemic crisis in the
sense in which they define one.  Still, under either set of definitions, banking problems
appear widespread, and likely affected most of the developing and transitional countries
in the last 15 years.
Why should anyone be concerned about banking crises?  As these and other
studies note, they have entailed high fiscal costs, often of 10-20% of GDP.  Although
such sums are 'only' transfer payments, their magnitudes are sufficient to derail
stabilization programs.  Governments in theory could finance these costs over a 10-20
year period, but in practice few have access to long term finance.  Thus governments hit4
with large negative net worth in their banking systems must consider a variety of
unattractive choices.  The low cost choice, at least in its immediate impact on the budget,
is to let depositors bear the burden.  Few governments, especially in the post-War period,
have been willing to make this choice, especially when losses were large, in all likelihood
because such a choice was perceived as dangerous to the administration's  survival or
perhaps as dangerous to the economy and leading to a long term disintermediation of the
formal financial system.  Baer and Klingebiel (1996) show that the latter effect did not
follow in selected cases.'  Nonetheless, either because prevalent opinion among policy
makers assumes extensive fallout from the imposition of losses on depositors, or due to
political concerns, most governments try to hide the cost of bank failures.
A popular choice is to bury the losses in the central bank's balance sheet.
However, this solution is risky: although the losses may remain hidden for some time,
they eventually put pressure on the central bank to find revenue sources. Unless the
economy is hit by positive shocks, the danger is that the central bank will resort to money
creation as net income declines.  The sharp rise in inflation in Argentina (from 165% in
1982 to over 600% in 1984-85), the Philippines (from 10% in 1983 to 50% and 23% in
1984-85, respectively) and to a lesser extent in Chile (in the early 1980s) likely derives in
large part from this method of covering the cost of bank insolvency.  Lastly, if domestic
capital markets lack sufficient depth, foreign borrowing has tended to be favored, with all
the usual debt servicing problems.
Systemic bank insolvency also should be a source of concern because it
demonstrates that capital has been -- and often continues to be -- misallocated.
Occasionally countries charge out of a banking crisis with rapid growth, or at least begin5
to see more robust growth after a period of several years as reforms take root.  Far more
prevalent is not just a drop in growth but a recovery that is sluggish relative to the pre-
crisis period.  Table 1 shows this latter effect, reporting the average growth rates 5 years
prior to and 5 years following each of the insolvency episodes in the C-K sample, and the
slowdown is statistically significant and slightly larger in developing than in
industrialized countries. To be sure, this holds nothing constant, and many factors
Table 1. Percentage Change in GDP Five Years before and after the Initiation of
Bank Insolvency, 1975-1994 (No. of observations in parenthesis)
Region  Mean GDP Growth
Five year before crisis  Five years after crisis
AIL1  Crisis Cases*  3.2%  2.0%
(290)  (240)
subsample
OECD countries*  2.8%  1.8%
(50)  (52)
Non-OECD countries*  3.3%  2.0%
(240)  (188)
Memo:
non-crisis countries**  2.2%  2.3%
(80)  (64)
*  A t-test (significant  at P<0.05)  indicates  that the pre- and post-crisis  means  differ.
**  Since there was no crisis in these countries, the sample was split in half, i.e., 1980-87
for the first  observation  and 1988-94  for the second. Although  it should  not be necessary,  a t-test
indicates  that  there  was no significant  slowdown  in the non-crisis  countries.
Source:  IMF, International  Financial  Statistics,  and Caprio  and Klingebiel,  1996b.
undoubtedly determine growth, but a more rigorous econometric examination will have
to await as many crises were in the early 1  990s, still too recent to yield statistically6
meaningful results. 2 Nonetheless, the fact that the non-crisis countries did not experience
a similar decline is consistent with the potential growth-reducing effects of a bank crisis.
Also, although many argue that poor growth causes banking crises, on average countries
experiencing banking crises saw sustained weaker growth following episodes of bank
insolvency, compared with the pre-crisis period.
Widespread bank insolvency means that incentives for taking prudent risks are
overwhehmed by other calculations, as low or negative net worth will encourage
excessive risk taking (Kane and Yu, 1994) or looting (Akerlof-Romer, 1993).  Banks that
excel in allocating one part of their portfolio imprudently seldom also excel in allocating
the rest of their portfolio brilliantly, and it is likely that the same is true of banking
systems.  If so, this would mean that countries which experience banking crises would
grow more slowly than others, or that those with a larger banking crisis (or more
insolvent system) would grow slower than those that are more solvent, both directly,
because the latter would have better allocated resources, and indirectly, as fewer/smaller
crises would lead to greater financial sector development and hence higher growth.
Unfortunately, it is not yet possible to test this hypothesis, as most of the episodes of
insolvency in either data set are quite recent, and thus insufficient time has passed for a
proper test.
The brief and recent literature on banking crises in developing countries argues
that a variety of macroeconomic and microeconomic factors account for systemic or
significant bank insolvency. C-K note that based on studies of a subset of 29 episodes of
insolvency in their data set, "... in all of them, deficient management, faulty supervision
and regulation, government intervention, and/or some degree of connected or politically7
rmotivated  lending are cited as primary factors behind bank insolvency;" macro factors
also were deemed important, but were not quite as omnipresent.  In many cases macro
factors, such as an overvalued exchange rate or a large terms of trade decline, often are
proximate causes of bank insolvency, but it is by no means clear that they are the most
important, much less the sole culprits.  Incentives facing bankers matter in determining
how they respond to the environment in which they operate.  In many countries, these
iilcentives are skewed, as bankers enjoy limited liability for any losses, and governments
provide implicit or explicit deposit insurance, yet have little legal, fiscal or supervisory
capacity to intervene when banks engage in excessive taking.  Brock (1996) argues that
as long as the institutions overseeing banks are underfunded, there will be a 'guarantor
risk,'  which will affect private behavior and induce more risky lending.  He states,
"Whatever may appear to be the proximate cause of the next financial crisis
in  Chile -- such as a speculative attack on the exchange rate, a perceived
lack of credibility of government fiscal policy, or an external shock -- the
severity  of  that  crisis  will  be  strongly  influenced  by  the  regulatory
framework as it affects bank behavior during the coming years" (p. 49).
So while it may be safe to conclude that banking problems in developing countries have
myriad causes, it may be more accurate to say that there are a wide variety of proximate
factors.  But the underlying weakness, namely the incentive system (or regulatory
environment, which in large part determines incentives) is where one should look for
lasting cures to systemic insolvency.
Policy Response in Practice
When nonfinancial firms become insolvent, the closure or restructuring process involves
a significant amount of pain: shareholders lose most or all of their investment, workers
are laid off, managers are sacked. The restructured nonfinancial firm usually has its8
business pared down to a smaller but still profitable core as a stand alone activity or by
merging with a solvent company, and access to outside finance usually is sharply
curtailed until these steps are well underway. 3 One might therefore expect that the
hallmark of a successful handling of bank insolvency would be similarly painful steps,
even if macro factors were partially responsible for the problem.  C-K find that there were
relatively few countries that handled bank insolvency successfully, based on indicators of
financial depth, real interest rates, credit growth to the private sector, and the recurrence
of another crisis. 4 Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that in remarkably few episodes is
there evidence of significant pain, and delay in loss recognition appears to be the most
common characteristic of most experiences.
Chile and Malaysia stand out, in terms of the aforementioned indicators, as having
superior post-crisis performance, and also in terms of the response by the authorities to
the crisis.  To be sure, in Chile there was considerable delay in the early 1980s in dealing
with bank insolvency, as regulators applied easier rules to postpone loss recognition.  In
both cases, ultimately, managers were sacked, shareholders bore losses, and fraud was
prosecuted.  More recently, increased attention was devoted to improving the information
available to banks and other market participants;  Chilean banks are now required to be
rated by private rating agencies twice a year, and there are also mandatory restrictions on
banks'  portfolios as leverage increases. 5 In Malaysia, a credit bureau was established on
borrowers, so that banks could better determine how borrowers might perform.  Another
performer with mostly favorable post-crisis indicators, New Zealand, has moved to a
market rating system in which the authorities do not collect or maintain information that
is not in the public domain, and have otherwise moved strongly to improve incentives in9
banlking  (Box 1). Most of  the changes  in this case  have  only been  effected  in 1996,
however,  so it is too early  to say how they  have been  functioning.
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The Argentine case also is instructive.  Argentina experienced banking crises in
the early 1980s, the late 1980s, and 1995 (the latter as fallout from the Mexican crisis).
Although financial depth has not recovered to the levels seen prior to the first crisis, it
was rising in the 1990s and appears to have recovered quickly from the early 1995
episode.  So although Argentina only rates a 'two'  on our scale, this may be misleading.
The most recent event featured a run on smaller, provincial banks, plus a run on the
currency for a few months when the commitment to the 1:  1 convertibility of the peso into
the dollar was in doubt. But the system recovered reasonably well, and the money center
banks, whose health did not appear to be in question, benefited from the consolidation, as
the number of banks declined from 200 in 1994 to 124 in early 1996 (Caprio, Dooley,
Leipziger, and Walsh, 1996). Also, the Argentine authorities instituted a number of
policies,  such as raising minimum capital requirements to a risk-weighted 11.5%, one of
the higher levels in the world.  They also significantly strengthened supervision in 1994,
and, in 1996, instituted a subordinated debt plan, requiring the periodic issuance of large
lumps of subordinated debt to create a class of uninsured creditors with a strong incentive
to monitor the banks.  Clearly, it is too soon to tell how effective these measures will be. 6
The Philippines, another relatively good post-crisis performer with a score of
'three,'  saw a marked improvement in the supervisory and regulatory framework: an
independent central bank was established, with the losses from the 1980s crisis carved out
of its balance sheet, the deposit insurance fund was recapitalized, government
interventions in banking were reduced, and supervision clearly upgraded.  Still, the
intervention by the judiciary in the bank closure process (by requiring a mandatory 90-
day minimum notification of banks after insolvency has been determnined,  so that11
shareholders have the opportunity to turnaround their bank before the authorities step in),
would appear to be excessively generous to shareholders and managers. Moreover, the
pace of real credit growth to the private sector in recent years has been quite rapid, as
much as 5 times real GDP; such rapid expansion has proven difficult manage safely in a
variety of countries.
The above list accounts for most of the relatively limited success stories.  In many
other countries, efforts to effect change in the regulatory/incentive environment were
distinctly muted or absent entirely.  For example, in one African country, only a small
fraction (5%) of written off loans was collected, less than that spent on the collection
effort.  And in Guinea, after virtually the entire banking system was closed in the mid-
1980s, there was little attempt to change the accounting, regulatory, or supervisory
approach, nor was disclosure improved; another crisis ensued in the early 1990s.
Moreover, few of the many small countries with bank insolvency problems have moved
to improve diversification of bank portfolios by encouraging more foreign banks or
greater foreign holdings by local banks.  And fewer still have acted to close banks or to
recduce  state ownership in finance.  Although merely relying on private ownership without
improving the incentive environment is dangerous -- witness Mexico in the early-mid
1  990s -- continued state ownership has not yet been able to produce efficient, well
managed banking.
Lastly, in several countries there has been an attempt to upgrade supervision,
though no clear evidence that this has been successful.  Many developing countries are
experiencing improved macroeconomic environments, thanks both to improved domestic
policies and low interest rates in industrial economies.  Still, even where a favorable12
macro draw has restored banks to solvency, the underlying risks appear to be little
changed except in very few countries.
III.  Standards  and Rules:  the salvation?
In searching  for cures  to any problem,  a popular approach  is to look for best practice  and
argue that it should  be universally  applied. One problem with this strategy  with respect
to dealing  with bank insolvency  is that it is quite recent  to draw conclusions  about  how
robust different remedies or regulatory structures are in practice.  As Kane (1993)
suggests, regulators and regulatees are locked in a dynamic game, and it is always
dangerous to assume that the game is over, not least when favorable macro climates are
bolstering bottom lines.
Another difficulty with applying best practice is that it is difficult to find.  In
arguing for an International Banking Standard (IBS), Goldstein (1996) implicitly takes
the industrial countries as the standard, even though a look at the IMF map of banking
problems (Figure 2) shows that these problems are almost (at least) as common in
industrial as in developing countries.  True, the data do suggest that bank insolvency is a
less costly problem, relative to GDP or total bank credit, in the OECD area than in
developing countries, but the smaller size of the latter countries, their larger shocks, and
more concentrated economies alone would lead one to predict that their bank crises
would be more costly.  In other words, if industrial economies were characterized by the
same quality of bank supervision as in developing countries, then one would expect to see
a markedly lower incidence of banking problems among richer countries because of their
other advantages, if, that is, the quality of bank supervision matters in determining the13
scope of banking problems. Thus one could conclude that it is not clear that richer
countries have 'gotten supervision right,'  much less that effective supervision is a
feasible, near term goal for developing countries.
Third, applying best practice in banking or bank regulation should be undertaken
with care, and with the realization that institutions -- the rules, procedures, and norms that
frame decisions of economic and political actors -- are crucial determinants of how well
any reforms can be transplanted to a new setting.  Well intentioned efforts fail: a World
Bank evaluation of 1  1  70 project components aimed at institutional development found
that 48% exhibited partial, and 23% negligible, achievements (de Capitani and North,
1994). In trying to lessen the incidence and cost of bank insolvency, one is attempting to
get a group of powerful and usually wealthy bankers, in many cases with close ties to the
clurrent  authorities, to behave in a socially more prudent fashion in the face of conflicting
private incentives, such as to refrain from big bets when their downside risks are covered,
or to ignore officials' guidance on lending decisions, even when to do so will strengthen
or allow them to retain their monopoly power.  Not surprising, then, such reforms often
are implemented in half measures and enforced at best with some irregularity.
One key institution that differs dramatically in many developing countries from
their industrial counterparts is the revenue system: not just the weak revenue base
associated with low incomes, but the efficiency of the system and the attitudes towards
paying taxes. Indeed, a key reason why many governments in developing countries relied
on financial repression was that they needed to make up for the inadequacies of the
formal tax system.'  Revenue problems make it likely that the govemment will be
providing an underfunded guarantee for bank depositors, and several observers, such as14
Brock (1996, noted above), argue persuasively that it is this underfunding of the
guarantee scheme that accounts for systemic insolvency problems. Regardless of how
sincere a government may be in upgrading its supervision or in, say, instituting prompt
corrective action and structured early intervention, these attempts will likely founder to
the extent that the supervisory authorities (or deposit insurer) cannot move against
insolvent institutions due to a lack of funding.
With these caveats in mind, what should developing countries do?  As noted
above, the reform being most discussed at present is the issue of an IBS, defined as an
attempt to bring "...more developing countries more quickly up to a minimum level of
sound banking practice and strong banking supervision (Goldstein, 1996, p. 1  5)," where
the IBS is to include common disclosure requirements, an accounting and legal
framework, transparency of government involvement, limits on connected lending, BIS
or higher risk-weighted capital ratios, consolidated supervision among host and home-
country supervisors, and perhaps more importantly, some form of structured early
intervention and prompt corrective action as embodied in FDICIA.
To be sure, guidelines in many of these areas, along with an education program to
teach officials (where needed) and electorates about the importance of each are useful.
Indeed, the World Bank developed a set of supervisory guidelines in the early 1  990s and
since then has been promulgating and improving them.  But it is one thing to propose best
practice guidelines and distinctly different to say that a single set of rules should be
imposed on all countries as the cure for what ails their banks. To see the issues and
difficulties, consider limits on connected lending and bank ownership. First, are limits a
good idea?  Certainly the Chilean crisis in the early 1980s is a convincing example of the15
dangers of such lending, at least until one reads Lamoreaux (1994), who argues that
connected lending was part of the reason for the growth of the New England economy
and the success of early 19th century banking there.
But even accepting that connected lending is to be avoided, or at least controlled, 8
can it be accomplished merely by promulgating limits?  In fact an increasing number of
countries have such limits, but it is rather easy to circumvent them.  Although Goldstein
argues that practices making it difficult or impossible for supervisors to verify the
accuracy of reports pertaining to connected lending should be outlawed, this is likely to
be a Herculean task.  Many developing countries feature highly concentrated wealth and
inicome  and a few are dominated by several large families. 9 Indicative of this
concentration, in data for a cross-section of 49 industrial and developing countries
(LaPorta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny,  1996), ownership of nonfinancial firms
(the only ones for which they obtained data) was more concentrated in developing than in
irLdustrial  countries, and authors do not make any attempt to correct for the possibility
that large shareholders might be affiliated with one another.  Also, the stock market
concentration ratios for industrial and developing  countries shows that concentration,
mneasured  by the capitalization of the largest  10 listed firms to total market capitalization,
was .44 in developing countries, compared with .31 in industrial economies (.28 if the
lower income industrialized countries, Greece and Portugal, are omitted or included with
the developing countries). In addition to greater concentration, institutions in many
countries often are less oriented to a democratic system of checks and balances than, say,
in the United States. These two characteristics together make the evasion of limits on16
connected lending 'child's play.' For the same reasons, limits on the ownership of banks
can be and are easily rendered inoperative.
A second aspect of an IBS, the improvement of the accounting and legal
framework, also is difficult to effect, and certainly cannot be accomplished soon in many
countries; more rapid progress has been seen in upper middle income countries, such as
Argentina and Chile, but would appear to be unrealistic in the many developing countries,
certainly in the 90 economies with per capita GDP below the upper middle income
level.'°  To argue otherwise is tantamount to suggesting that legal reform could be
achieved by mailing the U.S. legal code to a low income country. Many in fact have
quite serviceable laws or codes, but the judicial  system short-circuits implementation.
Judges, lawyers, and citizens need to be educated if legal reform is to take root.  For
accounting, trained accountants are needed -- more likely in middle income than in low
income countries -- and it takes time, effort, and incentives to get a chart of accounts
accepted."'  How would collateral be valued where markets are thin?  Can a loan
classification system be applied with few trained bankers or verified with few skilled
supervisors?  And even if supervisors had statutory authority to carry out their functions,
how would supervision operate if supervisors are closely connected to the industry, such
as through family or political ties, or if supervisors can be sued easily for their actions?
And if institutions are linked through family ownership, how valid are any set of accounts
as a guide to understanding the viability and prospects of an individual firm?
A third aspect of the IBS, the idea of mandating prompt corrective action and
structured early intervention, also appears to be a laudable goal, namely lessening the
extent to which supervisory forbearance can occur.  Again, however, the empirical17
evidence that such a system will limit bank insolvency is not yet apparent. Accepting
that it will be forthcoming, Berger (1993) argues that a good accounting (and loan
classification!) system is a requirement for FDICIA to operate well, as decisions are to be
made on capital levels.  Moreover, even if the U.S. legal system tolerates a government
closing private businesses while they still have positive net worth, in many other
countries it is sufficiently difficult to close those with negative net worth that it is hard to
believe that significant progress will be made soon.  As noted above, supervisors may
well have close links with the regulatees, and where governmental checks and balances
are weaker, it will be difficult for anyone to oversee supervisory compliance. Even in the
United States, proponents of prompt corrective action and structured early intervention
acknowledge that there may still be a 'too big to fail' problem.  But in developing
countries, banking systems often are more highly concentrated, meaning that it may be
more difficult still to believe that any prescribed 'automatic'  intervention or closure steps
will be taken.  Where concentration in banking is linked to concentration of wealth and
political power, it is even less likely that such changes will be readily introduced or
honored even if enacted. This is not to discourage attempts to make banking more safe
anLd  sound, but rather to suggest that pre-programmed changes cannot be quickly
implanted, if ever, in a variety of diverse institutional settings, and may create a false
sense of security.
Lastly, Goldstein suggests that higher capital should be part of an IBS to the
extent that risks are higher there, and this too would be set as part of the standard.
A]though encouraging some way to better align bankers'  incentives with those of society
is prudent, and higher minimum capital ratios has been argued by several, including this18
author, as a possible way to do so, it is by no means clear that it is the best way.  First,
quantitative limits on capital may be useful but it is far harder to mandate the quality of
capital.  Owners often put up resources of differing degrees of quality, including
borrowing funds from their own institution, and this can be difficult to detect, especially
in countries dominated by relatively few groups or farnilies.  Second, the effect of higher
capital on risk taking is theoretically ambiguous: it is quite possible that a higher
requirement could lead owners to select a point further out on the risk-retum frontier, and
empirical investigations find relatively little difference in the probability of failure from
different capital levels (Berger, Herring, and Szego, 1995).  So if authorities in a country,
after understanding the alternative approaches, argue that raising capital may be the only
feasible way, given their country's  institutions, to bring about more prudent banking, it
would be wise to support this attempt.  Such support, however, is a far cry from
mandating this approach.
What are the alternatives -- not just to raising capital but to an IBS?  There are
three distinct groups that can monitor banks: bank owners (and managers), the market
(including uninsured debtholders and other possible 'co-owners')  and supervisors, and
these groups could be regarded as three of the four pillars supporting a safe and sound
banking system.  Emphasizing the need to build the capacity and incentives for each of
these groups to perform their function effectively would appear sensible, given both the
uncertainty about which group is more effective and because ideally these three monitors
would complement one another. In official circles, the pendulum has swung excessively
in favor of supervision; given the arguments above, greater emphasis on owners and the
market is warranted.  Moreover, it would seem indispensable to rely on local authorities19
and their assessment of their own institutions in deciding on the balance of emphasis
arnong the different monitors.  Local officials have to be relied on to decide how to
balance these different monitors and how any changes would work in their own
institutional setting.  Greater reliance on owners and the market is attractive for several
reasons:
*  it resembles closely the path followed by various industrialized nations when
they were industrializing;
*  it allows poor countries to employ scarce human capital in more directly
productive pursuits, rather than in bank supervision; and
improving incentives and information for owners and the market to monitor
banks is likely to payoff by itself and would complement the development of
supervision.
Improving incentives for owners, while minimizing the need for supervisory oversight,
likely can be accomplished either by greater liability limits, increasing the franchise value
of bank licenses (see Caprio, 1997), or by higher capital.  Unfortunately there has not
been sufficient experimentation, at least in recent times, with these different approaches,
so statements about 'best practice' are on empirically shaky ground.  Nor is it clear that
one approach need work best in all economies.  In particular, solutions such as relying
more on franchise value or higher liability limits are attractive in economies in which
capital is scarce and the capacity and institutional structure conducive for effective
supervision (in particular, independence of the supervisory agency) are weak.20
The market's ability to oversee banks would be fostered not only by greater
disclosure but also by using mutual liability, subordinated debt or other ways to create
large, uninsured debtholders. Mutual liability appeared to work well in U.S.
clearinghouse associations in the 19th century, and in Canada, but more recent evidence
is hard to uncover.
Importantly, convincing governments that substantially beefing up supervision (or
any of the three above pillars) alone will produce safe and sound banking may well be
unwise in small developing countries.  Broad diversification is the fourth pillar
supporting a sound financial system.  Where risks are both high and concentrated, it is
difficult to believe that governments will raise capital (or liability limits) sufficiently high
or allow immensely profitable banking to offset the disadvantages of large shocks and
highly covariance.  In such cases, governments should only allow well diversified banks,
whether foreign or domestic.  If a greater role were accorded the incentive system in
ensuring safety and soundness, this would become more apparent, for example with better
diversified banks being able to hold less capital.
Each of these various approaches has its strengths and weaknesses, just as with
the IBS.  Indeed, that is the point: there is no empirical evidence to point to, or at least not
a large sample, which would allow a disinterested observer to conclude as to the
superiority of one path. Until such evidence is assembled, it would seem appropriate for
industrial country authorities and multinational organizations to encourage developing
counterparts to strengthen all four pillars and to advise them on the pros and cons of the
various alternatives.  The IBS approach relies excessively on supervision and discounts21
the importance of owners, the market, and diversification as ways to enhance safety and
soundness
IV.  New Directions: Back to the Future?
To deduce from the scope and magnitude of banking crises worldwide that monitoring
and incentives are insufficient would appear to be safe.  An early view of banking crises
concluded,
...any suspension of specie payments, any bank failure, in fact any default of
payment  whether by  a  government  or  by  an  individual,  can  usually be
connected with  certain external economic  causes.  In the last analysis the
answer to this question depends not upon the reasoning which one employs
but  the  premises  from  which  one  starts:  if  we  assume  that  business
depressions  and  'unfavorable  trade  balances'  are  economic acts of  God'
against which the individual, the bank, or the government is powerless, then
the plea that these unfavorable factors were the 'cause'  has a plausible ring.
But if we recognize that ups and downs  are recurring, that a well managed
organization must be prepared for the lean years when they come, and that a
factor  of  safety is just  as  essential  in  an  economic  institution as  in  an
engineering  structure, then  this  plea  of  unfavorable  circumstances as  the
cause becomes an admission of poor  management,  and not  a justification.
[Fetter, 1931, p. 31]12
This view is an extreme one.  Just as no one would recommend constructing only those
buildings able to withstand a once-in-a-millennium shock, it would be costly to establish
financial systems capable of surviving similarly rare events,  as they would in all
likelihood be too averse  to taking prudent risks.  Still, the direction in which Fetter points
policy makers is toward focusing on the incentive system in which banks operate. The
key debate, and one that has not yet begun to be discussed openly, is how robust should
banking systems be made.  Although most would agree that all should be able to22
withstand seasonal shocks, and likely even those that occurred every several years, should
they be able to tolerate shocks of the type seen every 10, 20, or 50 years?
However this question is answered,  it would appear that the safeguards needed
would be greater in developing countries, due in part to the greater volatility there.
Whereas volatility in policies is at least capable of being controlled, the small size and
concentrated nature of developing to industrial economies means that shocks there will be
larger.  So any dose of medicine need to be stronger.
This paper also argued that cures for bank insolvency have to be attuned to the
institutional settings of developing countries.  Poor countries do not differ from richer
ones only in their GDP per capita, but also in an array of institutions that bear on how
effective financial intermediation will be and on how attempts to fix the regulatory or
incentive environment will be.  Also, industrial economies put in place a safety net for the
banking system when they had reached a high level of development -- not just a higher
income level but more effective legal institutions and a greater reliance on democratic
processes and arms-length transactions.  In short, just like in the 1950s economists
learned that 'merely' increasing capital would not convert poor countries into rich ones, it
is unlikely that we will find that standardizing some regulations and improving
supervision will cure the bank insolvency epidemic.  Thus a more appropriate role for
multilateral institutions and OECD governments is to encourage a multi-pillar approach
to achieving an incentive-compatible banking system as well as to foster more research
into what is still a remarkably under-researched field: how insolvency comes about, how
authorities deal with it, and how different approaches compare and affect the
development of the financial system and growth.23
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Notes
Interestingly, Baer and Klingebiel (1996) find, based on a study of 5 countries (Estonia, 1992;
Argentina,  1989; Malaysia, 1986; Japan, 1946; and the United States, 1933), that imposing losses on
depositors had minimal negative impact on economic performance when "policy makers took a
comprehensive approach to resolving financial system distress and sought to ensure that only well
capitalized institutions will remain in operation (B-K, p 196)."
2  Thus only those countries with 5 years of post-crisis data were included.
[n banking, this reaction is often short-circuited by implicit or explicit government deposit guarantees,
making it possible for insolvent institutions to gather deposits.  The opaque nature of banking contributes
to the ability of bankers to delay loss recognition.
4  'Countries  were awarded one point each if following an episode of bank insolvency: financial depth
increased, real short term deposit interest rates were neither excessively negative (below -5%) nor above
10%, real credit growth was positive but less than 2.5 times real GDP growth), and there was no repeated
crisis.  Malaysia, Chile, Australia, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States scored a 'four'  on
these criteria, 12 countries scored a 'three,'  23 a 'two,'  16 a 'one,'  and 5 a 'zero'  (C-K, 1996b, Table 6).
5 In the restructuring of bad debts, Chilean banks had their bad loans taken over by the Central Bank, with
the stipulation that the originating banks had to buy them back over a period of time (which eventually was
extended).  The resignation this year by former Central Bank Governor Roberto Zahler was associated with
an attempt to put some of the cost onto that institution, rather than on the commercial banks or the
Treasury, and indicates that there still may be some incentive problems in the banking system.
6  The commitment to a currency board -- convertibility of pesos into dollars -- means that the central bank
canrmot  serve as a lender of last resort. Before the most recent crisis, Argentina explicitly had no deposit
insurance, and depositors at small banks lost when these institutions failed.  With the 1995 crisis, the
authorities instituted a deposit insurance scheme, covering $20,000 (about 2.5 times per capita GDP) per
depositor.  Since the deposit insurance fund cannot by law draw on the budget, and the central bank has
little discretion in expanding the money supply, the authorities evidently decided that they need a highly
incentive compatible regulatory system.
7  See Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and Bencivenga  and Smith (1992). The latter argue that given the
underdevelopment of the revenue system, a resort to financial repression may well be optimal.
s  In fact it is likely that the 'insider lending' Lamoreaux cites was controlled, in that, even though
delpositors evaluated banks on the basis of the underlying businesses in which bank directors were
involved, they also would have disciplined banks from lending too much to one connected business. Also,
this form of connected lending functioned well at least in part due to the importance of reputation.  Failed
bankers could not so easily de-camp to other locales.  Thus it may not be happenstance that this form of
banking diminished as migration became more popular.
9  Gini coefficients for the 1986-93 period are as follows: Sub-Saharan Africa, 44.7; East Asia, 36.2; South
Asia, 34.1; Middle East and North Africa, 40.8; Latin America, 50.2; OECD, 33.2.  See Deininger and
Squire, 1996.
A per capita GDP of approximately $3000 was the cutoff point for the upper middle income range.
I am indebted to Fernando Montes-Negret for pointing out that the Chinese Federation of Accountants
estimates that they need to train 100,000 accountants by the year 2000 and 300,000 by 2010!
12  Thanks to Phil Brock for calling this quote to my attention.Figure 1 Bank Insolvency  since 1980
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